No Patience For H. B. Fahnbulleh’s Tired Writings: Debunking Sophism
May 9, 2005
Author: Samuel D. Tweah, Jr.
The conclusion of H. B. Fahnbulleh's "Before the Time Comes" summons "deflated and demoralized" remnants of the "Progressive" movement to a national conference to "deal with the question of a national direction…” In “We Must Run While They Walk,” an apparent sequel, he asks “how have the politicians failed Liberia?” Playing part guru and part propagandist in his latest article, H. B. plunges into a highly self-contradictory argument, reversing all previous positions he once staked in the great debate on the march of modern Liberian history. In this piece, I trace the trajectory of H. B’s troubled intellectual inconsistency and diminish the weak arguments he presents on a number of critical questions. However, suffice it briefly to digress to deal with the “messenger” behind this recent “platitudinous effusion.”
Fahnbulleh is afflicted with Progressive nostalgia. He bemoans the passing of an era and the loss of an audience. He craves a gone Liberian age in which his hollow philosophical ranting will mobilize people to action. And he fantasizes about reconstructing Liberia’s social order from the debris of a failed Progressive movement. But more importantly, H. B. begrudges what he sees coming: the liberation of the masses from the distorted precepts of governance imposed upon them by a highly corrupt political class. This he fears the most, and for which he has now been recruited to celebrate the very same forces he once vilified.
Condemn an object in one breath , uphold it in another. Resign from the LPP yesterday, berating Togba Nah Tipoteh and feuding with Amos Sawyer, rejoin the LPP today to “gather the forces.” Lambaste Ellen Sirleaf yesterday as a lady who as finance minister under Tolbert “presided over the wastage of millions of dollars for the OAU jamboree at a time when the Liberian people were struggling for basic health care;” celebrate her today and say that “I would normally not come to her defense but since some want to condemn her as part of a collective, I will defend her.” Has H. B. now become the hired pen spin-doctoring the political missteps and failings of individuals he previously scolded? Does he defend Sirleaf out of conviction or only because others oppose her? Can this man maintain any consistent position long before his ink dries? What has he now become, an intellectual mercenary, cavorting from one cause or idea to the next? When did he convert to the idea that Progressives need to be united? Did not his over-inflated hatred of Charles Taylor provide a catalyst for bringing Progressive forces together in 1997? Or does Fahnbulleh now fear George Manneh Weah more than he once dreaded Charles Taylor?
These questions expose the chameleon character behind misguided commentaries penned in the guise of reason. Fahnbulleh’s vacillation destroys his authority to impart any understanding of Liberian history. Such inconsistency indicates confusion. One cannot provide knowledge or wisdom from the fountain of confusion. Over the years, we have all watched H. B. regaled the public mind with articles about the tragedy of Liberian democracy. We have seen him locked in interminable debates with different personages. Many of his thoughts have indeed been penetrating; reinforced by an ostensible show of rhetorical power. But recently as I have observed his political movements and utterances, especially as it concerns his unconscionable repositioning on important issues, I can only conclude that H. B. may now be affected by a form of diminishing intellectual returns. He seems to have reached the nadir of his intellectual utility. How can this man assume such crass arrogance that whatever falsehood he projects will stand on the merit of his intellectual personality, not on the force of his argument. H. B needs to be restored to intellectual sanity.
In “We Must Run While They walk,” he refutes claims that he has argued for the surrender of Liberian sovereignty; dreads the holding of elections in October 2005; defends the Progressive movement or Liberia’s traditional political class as not “erecting a culture of social disorganization,” because they have not governed; misstates the arguments about who has failed in Liberia by alluding to false claims that the “academically enlightened have failed the nation;” defends Ellen Sirleaf; attacks George Weah; and generally whines in a verbiage befitting a frustrated politician whose 25-year politicking in Liberia has come to naught.
Let’s now consider four issues he discusses in his piece: the question of the failure of Liberia’s political class; of violence concerning that class; the misstated claim that the “academically enlightened have failed,” and of course, his feeble attack against George Manneh Weah, that new generation hero presently catalyzing the forces of radical and progressive change in Liberia.
How Have the Politicians Failed Liberia?
He argues it is wrong to believe politicians have failed Liberia. He maintains that a whole political class cannot fail in that “the political class is not a single group with one direction.” Then he names the segment of Liberia’s political class that failed, writing “when we say the political class has failed, we are talking about that segment that that held power under the True Whig Party; that fooled around with the military from 1983 to 1990; with the NPFL from 1997 to 2003; and now, with the present arrangement.” Notice that he cuts off the years 1980 to 1983 from his delineation; because those were the years he served Samuel Doe as Minister of Education and Foreign Affairs. He also omits the years 1990-1995 when he served as roving envoy to Sawyer’s IGNU government, wasting scarce Liberian resources on meaningless trips. Yet this is a man who writes “an honest person will search for the truth no matter how it is hidden. A dishonest person will refuse to accept the truth no matter how obvious.” Is there a greater example of intellectual dishonesty? Certainly, we must crush falsehood and establish truth in this article.
Now that we have established that H. B. and some others are also part of the political class that failed, it spares us a little time and space to even belabor why they failed. He himself put it simply; they fooled around with the military regime from 1980 to 1990. Not only that, they failed massively in coercing political change in a society they least understood and at a time they were least prepared for it.
Progressives primarily failed in their inability to manage political opposition against Tolbert. They coerced change and fled its consequences. Those who take upon themselves the mantle to evolve change in any society are considered revolutionaries only when they anticipate and understand the forces of change they unleash on a people and are willing to abide the consequences. Progressives were schooled in the communist revolutionary cannon, but least understood its practical dimensions. Such description only befits revolutionaries like Fidel Castro of Cuba. Fidel’s instigation against the former Cuban leader Batista was not one of merely putting men in the streets to cause havoc, hoping to assume power out of the chaos. He understood the dynamic of Cuban society and conceived the basis of an institution that would deal with power after Batista’s dethronement. Fahbulleh and his Progressive band did quite the contrary. These men organized personality cults in the form of PAL, or MOJA with no institutional foundation and no understanding of how to manage power. Because they were the first generation of indigenous intellectuals which had returned from abroad with a modicum of learning at a time political change was demanded, the mantle fell naturally upon them. And their situation was even made easier. Tolbert was willing to institute drastic reforms. By the mid 70’s he and moderates within the TWP fully understood that Tubman’s Unification, Integration and Open Door policies had unleashed social, political and economic forces beyond the grasp of the party. Consciousness had spread through the population. Tolbert sensed this. His immediate response was to launch a massive reform effort. He ended the practice of public employees remitting a portion of their salary to the TWP; clamped down on corruption though it remained a fixture of the TWP oligarchy; encouraged women involvement in politics by appointing women to cabinet positions; launched a four year development plan in 1974; directed the lowering of the price of rice; abolished monopoly on importing rice; and liberalized the political climate by permitting more political organizing and the voicing of dissent. But what did the progressives make out of this? They saw it as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to cease power for which they had no plan. This greed for power led to intra-factional bickering among their rank and file.
As their cults of personality widened, the actions of different Progressive organizations became ascribed to their respective founders. The April 14, 1979 rice riot was patented by Bacchus Matthews. Tipoteh personalized MOJA’s modest successes. Theoreticians Sawyer and H. B. bided their opportunity to upstage both Matthews and Tipoteh. Disunity and suspicion became rife within the group. MOJA did not sanction PAL’s April 14 rice riot and its 1980 mid-night march against Tolbert, which Tipoteh characterized as “at best infantile and rather ridiculous.” Such wrangling led to the tragic failure to anticipate and develop a strategic framework for managing power in the context of the rapid political change the country was now going through.
All H. B. and his Progressive cabal cared about was to mobilize for mass action and foment tension, out of which anything could happen. Change in Liberia now depended on happenstance, on historical accidents. This was the Progressive prescription for producing change. They did not mobilize to build institutions able to survive trying political times. Regime change was their obsession. And when their numerous agitations did produce change, what did they do? They banded with Doe, encouraged the slaughtering of former TWP officials and jostled for influence and power, carefully watching one another’s advances. This is just an overview of Progressive failure of the 70’s going into early 80’s. The political class as H. B. has noted comprises more than just progressives. Let’s briefly examine its other components and do so via the lens of Fahnbulleh himself, maybe to point another instance of flip-flopping.
In “Liberia and Democracy” he writes:
“The charade has long since ended. What grumblings there remain are the reflexes of frustrated politicians who helped orchestrate the farce, but were themselves duped in the end by more unscrupulous political tricksters. The tragedy of this whole affair is that the people, in their determination to oust the racketeers who now rule their country, are willing and ready to sacrifice their lives in defense of the domestic opposition, without realizing that those who now lead this opposition are the very people who through cunning and stealth imposed Sergeant Samuel Doe and his band of thieves on them in the first place.”
Yes! This is vintage Fahnbulleh in his brutal candor, capturing the emergent decay of a political culture that would prove problematic for the country over the next two decades. One can only wish he would maintain that position. Unfortunately, two decades later, he doesn’t. Yesterday, he considers the political class a colossal failure, today he touts it as not “erecting a culture of social disorganization.” Which position are we to accept? I prefer the earlier version because it bears the hallmark of H. B. in the heyday of his fearless honesty. Numerous events may have now compromised that prior substance. Anyway, let’s deal with the man in his current metamorphosed personality. He writes “one cannot accuse a people or a political class of ‘erecting a culture of social disorganization’ when the decay brought about has to do with the repression, brutality and irresponsibility of those who hold power.” Ohm, quite a stretch! Is H. B arguing that this decay was caused by Doe’s brutality? He continues, “If this class has not held power for twenty-five years, how is it possible for it to have erected “a culture of social disorganization?” Yes. That is highly possible and this is what happened in Liberia. The answer lies right there, in H. B’s own prose as quoted earlier. Opposition political elements, in wheeling and dealing with sitting governments or leaders, affect both the style and substance of governance. Because members of Liberia’s political class are predominantly in politics for selfish reasons, they have usually acted in ways that send mixed messages to leaders. Take Samuel Doe and some of his cabinet for example; H. B. Fahnbulleh as Education minister, Togba Nah Tipoteh from Planning and Economic Affairs and Bacchus Matthews at Foreign. There three Progressives sitting at the high table. What went wrong? Different theories and speculation abound. Is it that pre-1980 bickering among progressives carried over into the new regime? Or were progressives in government countered by other forces (Fahnbulleh’s version) that feared Progressive influence and power? Affirmative answers to any of these questions only indicates that the “decay” H. B. mentions as having “to do with the repression, brutality and irresponsibility of those who hold power,” actually originates elsewhere. This is only logical. A “culture of social disorganization” is just what it is: a culture. Cultures evolve, comprising the habits, precepts, mores and values of a people from one era to the next. How can H. B. argue Liberia’s social disorganization originated with Samuel Doe? Did not Progressive opposition in the 70’s indicate a smoldering of this decay, which only festered in the 80’s and beyond? Could it be that the prolonged deprivation of Liberia’s indigenous mass created a culture in which formerly deprived indigenous leaders decided to maximize the gains for themselves once they gain power or access to it, just as True Whig Party leaders had done? These are theoretical considerations that render weak the claim that a “political class has to be in power before it can affect a culture of social disorganization.” Fahnbulleh would never have made this argument in 1983 after he had abandoned Samuel Doe.
The Political Class Did Not Introduce Violence in Liberia
Lets now deal with the question of violence and examine closely H. B.’s statement that the “political class did not introduce violence in Liberia.” He writes, “as a matter of fact this class has always indulged in what some commentators refer to as ‘jaw-jaw instead of war-war.’ This is the nature of intellectuals and other educated people. They analyze, speculate and diagnose instead of resorting to arms as the first recourse for settling disputes. However, there is a rare breed of such people who would readily resort to violence. In this category are those who combine their political ideas with radical action to change a situation. But even here, this form of action/protest is resorted to after thorough deliberation and consideration.” H. B. continues, “in Liberia, from the death of Tubman to 1980, various segments of the political class argued, analyzed, debated, and speculated, but did not once resort to violence to take power.” This is plain baloney and intellectual confusion. Here he attempts to distinguish mob action such as April 14 rice riot against Tolbert, which was indeed violent, from Doe’s overthrow or Taylor’s rebel insurgency. Does he understand the role of the violence in the overthrow of Tolbert; the April 14 1979 rice riot and the arrests of Matthews and others for charges of planning violence? Is he now flipping back to a position of detesting violence after celebrating it for so many years? The confusion is profound. In one section of the article, he extols the role of violence in producing change, arguing “It was only in the context of violent repression by a regime which had no legitimacy that some patriots decided to act. This is the only way patriots throughout history have acted. In the face of brutal and savage repression by tyrants, heroic patriots have risen to their responsibility to redeem their nation and people.” He asks further “Are patriots to refrain from decisive action against injustice because people will die in the process? History does not move in this way. In our case, after 1985, there was nothing to show that the regime would not go on killing, terrorizing and brutalizing the people as was done between 1980-84.” Writing all this, yet maintaining that “the political class did not introduce violence in Liberia.” Where are we headed? Can this man take one position and maintain it throughout a discourse?
The ‘Academically Enlightened have failed Liberia’
It is sad that H. B. stoops to lending credence to false claims that the “academically enlightened have failed Liberia.” He belabors the claim, going so far as to state the obvious. That “there are many educated people who have contributed positively to our development but have not been in the political class. There are farmers, midwives, medical doctors, bankers, engineers, teachers, scientists, agronomists, etc. without whose contribution we would not have our people surviving today.” This needs no arguing. The argument is not that the academically enlightened have failed, but that academically enlightened political actors of the brand of Fahnbulleh and his progressive cabal, coupled with other political degenerates, have used the political process in Liberia as a platform to self-enrichment and power aggrandizement. This is the argument. The masses have seen that those who advocate for change in Liberia mask their real intentions which become exposed when they assume power or enjoy access to it. And they have held power in one form or another, in the early 1980’s, and during the IGNU regime, though H. B. would disagree. Where is the evidence that Progressives and other political leaders have championed the interest of the masses when they were able to pull the levels of power? During the regime of IGNU, Fahnbulleh roved the planet as Special Envoy, achieving nothing, but wasting scare Liberian resources in the process. While he did that, his younger IGNU Progressive cadres were drinking beer and wasting public money on flashy girls in Monrovia. The nation’s currency was changed during this era and we all know the story of how IGNU officials reaped a fortune out of the process. These are the enlightened ones who are considered failures by the masses and not all educated people as H. B. would have us believe. But H. B introduces the misstated claim as a means to begin an attack on an unassailable character, a man who now holds the greatest promise of delivering the aspiration of our people: GMW.
On The Issue of George Weah
H. B. waffles in a pool of trivial arguments which I will not deal with because they have been considerably dealt with elsewhere. We cannot rehash failed arguments about Weah’s education, leadership ability or experience. However, he asks three questions he believes are critical for electing Weah to the Liberian presidency: 1) “How many kids has [Weah] assisted in school or college?” 2) “Has he built a soccer school for poor kids to attend like Patrick Viera and others have done in Senegal?” And 3) “Has Weah ever been a part of any social or political struggles for the promotion and defense of justice, liberty and equality?” Now, going by H. B.’s logic if Weah has done any one of these, then he deserves to be president. Let’s follow that line of reasoning and respond to each question. 1) Yes, Weah has assisted countless number of high school and college students. In the late 90’s Weah provided money to Abraham Massaley’s ULSU leadership which defrayed scholarship costs for downtrodden students at the UL. 2) No. Weah has not built a school for soccer kids. 3) Yes. Weah has contributed to the struggle to rid Liberia of tyranny. In 1996 his home was looted and burnt, relatives raped when Weah progressively suggested the UN intervened in Liberia to save the country from continued tyranny. So according to his own logic, H. B. agrees that Weah can be president because the man has achieved two of out three of his concerns.
But at a more advanced level H. B’s questions betrays the Progressive spirit, if there is one. How can this highly reputed Progressive elevate the influence of money, possibly bad money, in Liberian politics? The notion that to be president an individual will have to personally finance projects, while commendable, is dangerous. Such a prescription encourages crooks with vast financial means to seek the presidency. The massive trust Weah now enjoys is not in the concretion of what he did—monies he spent, scholarships he gave—but rather in the sheer patriotic symbolism of his giving, especially at a time when corruption defined the country. The masses believe that were Weah to guard the national treasury and administer the distribution of resources, their interests would be served far more than if a selfish and greedy Progressive leader were to assume power.
Weakening his case further, H. B. writes, “Weah is not the only great footballer in Africa, but in other countries, the people know how and where a man’s talent can best be used. In Guinea, we find Petit Sorie, Titi Kamara and others. These men are great footballers. Have we heard them talking about ruling Guinea? In Cameroon, there are Roger Miller, Rigobert Song, Samuel Eto'o, Patrick Mboma, Geremi Fotso Njitap and many others.” Are we now seeing the “maggots or the carcass” of H. B’s intellectual remains? What childish logic is this? Below is his syllogism:
Roger Miller is rich.George Weah is rich. Roger Miller is a former football player.George Weah is a former football player.Miller does not want the presidency of Cameroun. Therefore: Weah should not seek the presidency of Liberia. Where do they teach this kind of reasoning? What if I were to counter with the equally false syllogism:
Arnold Schwarzenegger is a celebrity.Jesse Ventura is a celebrity.Arnold and Jesse both sought the governorship of their respective states in the US.
George Weah is a celebrity in Liberia.Therefore: G. W. too should seek the Liberian presidency. This is where H. B. wants to take us. We cannot oblige.
Importantly, to whom is he addressing his question, “what has George Weah done for Liberia…?” Is he making a case to the masses? Does he regard the masses as the ultimate determinant of any criteria for candidates who desire their votes? The masses have long since concluded that they will do no political business with rabble rousers like Fahnbulleh who theorize one thing and practice another. They have borne numerous insults from the likes of Fahnbulleh who writes, “poverty-stricken masses care less for human rights than for the satisfaction of their basic needs.” He further degrades the masses in “Democracy and Liberia” when he writes that “the new military leaders were from the downtrodden of society--that humiliated and degraded mass for whom money means everything.” Yet, this is the man who is confused about why the masses crave George Weah.
The Liberian masses have endured many a tragedy. They have borne two dictatorships imposed upon them by misguided elements who risked a country’s future by tinkering with change when they were least prepared for it. They rejected the political class and voted Taylor in 1997 because it was the very political class who empowered him to pillage and terrorize the country. How could they reject Taylor and endure his post-election defeatist violence while those who armed and supported him sheltered in the comfort of America? Our people are not stupid. The political class deceived them by imposing a tyrant upon them. They could only reward that deceit by legitimizing the tyrant. Deceit for deceit. It is sad that the masses took a hit in electing Taylor as president, but they live on to fight another day. That day has now dawned in the populist emergence of the patriot George Manneh Weah.
So H. B. and others who believe that the populist groundswell bringing Weah to power is a “mobocracy” and are vowing to resist it can brace themselves for a tough battle. Anyways, what are threats from men like H. B. who flirt with danger and flee when tension heightens? Can he explain the Pandema Road Prison Situation in Sierra Leone in which he led several young militants in an attack against Samuel Doe but cowardly escaped, leaving several to be butchered in cold blood. Where is the proof of vaunted militant bravado? Vacuous utterances, bereft of any practical effect. He could not achieve politically. Neither could he militarily. Yet this is the man who vows to resist a people’s genuine struggle, summoning battered Progressives to a lost cause, and quoting the Mwalimu in the process.
When Mwalimu taught that “we must run while they walk” he was addressing that core of true African visionaries and revolutionaries; men and women who “knit rather than unravel nations” as Robert Rotberg from Harvard puts it. H. B. Fahnbulleh cannot quote this great old man with any authority because H. B. too has betrayed the teachings of the Mwalimu. George Weah and the new breed of revolutionaries will pick up after the Mwalimu. This is the mantra of the new generation!!!
About the Author:
Samuel D. Tweah, Jr. currently resides in Minnesota, USA and can be reached at dtweah@yahoo.com