SAO BOSO KAMARA CORNER

“Having sold your land and accepted payment, you must accept the consequences”. This site is christened after the 19th Century Bopolu and Guadu-Gboni Mandingo King, Sao Boso Kamara, in the hope that his equitable and just approach to reconciling the elements of the Liberian population will serve as a lesson for fashioning a lasting solution to our national quandary. Let the betterment of others be your vocation.

Monday, May 09, 2005

Termination and Re-Designation of Liberia for Temporary Protected

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYBureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

Termination and Re-Designation of Liberia for Temporary Protected Status (8/25/2004)

AGENCY: Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.

ACTION: Notice. (8/25/2004)

SUMMARY: The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation of Liberia will expire on October 1, 2004. This notice terminates the current designation of Liberia and re-designates Liberia for TPS. The Attorney General designated Liberia for TPS on October 1, 2002. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had extended Liberia TPS through October 1, 2004. After reviewing conditions in Liberia, the Secretary of DHS finds that, while the armed conflict has ended, there are extraordinary and temporary conditions that prevent the safe return of nationals to Liberia. The re-designation will allow nationals of Liberia who have been continuously physically present in the United States since August 25, 2004, and continuously resided in the United States since October 1, 2002, to apply for TPS. This notice also sets forth procedures necessary for nationals of Liberia (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Liberia) to register for TPS. All current Liberia TPS beneficiaries who wish to continue to receive TPS benefits will have to register for TPS according to the procedures set forth in this notice.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The re-designation of Liberia's TPS designation is effective October 1, 2004, and will remain in effect until October 1, 2005. The registration period begins August 25, 2004, and will remain in effect until February 21, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Colleen Cook, Residence and Status Services, Office of Programs and Regulations Development, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, 111 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20529, telephone (202) 514-4754.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

What Authority Does the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Have To Terminate the Designation of Liberia and Re-Designate Liberia Under the TPS Program?

On March 1, 2003, the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Service) transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296. The responsibilities for administering the TPS program held by the Service were transferred to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS).

Under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. 1254a, the Secretary of DHS, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, is authorized to designate a foreign state (or part thereof) for TPS. The Secretary of DHS may grant TPS to eligible nationals of that foreign state (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in that state).

Section 244(b)(3)(A) of the Act requires the Secretary of DHS to review, at least 60 days before the end of the TPS designation or any extension thereof, the conditions in a foreign state designated under the TPS program to determine whether the conditions for a TPS designation continue to be met and, if so, the length of an extension of TPS. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A). If the Secretary of DHS determines that the foreign state no longer meets the conditions for TPS designation, he shall terminate the designation, as provided in section 244(b)(3)(B) of the Act. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B). Finally, if the Secretary of DHS does not determine that a foreign state (or part thereof) no longer meets the conditions for designation at least 60 days before the designation or extension is due to expire, section 244(b)(3)(C) of the Act provides for an automatic extension of TPS for an additional period of 6 months (or, in the discretion of the Secretary of DHS, a period of 12 or 18 months). 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(C).

Why Did the Secretary of DHS Decide To Terminate and Re-Designate Liberia Under the TPS Program?

On October 1, 2002, the Attorney General published a notice in the Federal Register designating Liberia under the TPS program based on its ongoing armed conflict. 67 FR 61664. The Secretary of DHS extended this TPS designation by Notice published in the Federal Register on August 6, 2003 at 68 FR 46648, determining that the conditions warranting such designation continued to be met.

Since the date of the most recent extension, DHS and the Department of State (DOS) have continued to review conditions in Liberia. DHS and DOS have determined that, because the armed conflict has concluded, the conditions that prompted designation no longer exist. Accordingly, the Secretary of DHS is terminating the designation of Liberia for TPS under 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B). However, the Secretary of DHS finds that there are extraordinary and temporary conditions in Liberia that prevent the safe return of certain nationals of Liberia (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Liberia). Further, it is determined that it is not contrary to the national interest of the United States to permit nationals of Liberia (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Liberia) who qualify for TPS to remain temporarily in the United States. Therefore, the re-designation of Liberia for TPS is warranted under 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C).

DOS observes that a peace agreement has been signed and that the civil war has ended. (DOS Recommendation (May 12, 2004)). The BCIS Resource Information Center (RIC) reports that between March and May 2004 there were no reports of conflict. (RIC Report (July 1, 2004)). The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program has begun; however, the United Nations has not completed the demobilization of the armed groups. (DOS Recommendation (May 12, 2004)). Approximately 42,000 combatants from the three armed factions (Liberian government forces, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)) have been disarmed since December 2003. Estimates of the total number of combatants range from 40,000 to 60,000. Id. In June 2004, the United Nations Security Council decided to continue sanctions on diamond and timber exports due to widespread corruption in the new government and failure of the government to effectively control large swathes of the interior. (RIC Report (July 1, 2004)).

The protracted civil war has damaged Liberia's infrastructure. Eighty percent of the pre-war housing stock has been damaged. (RIC Report (July 1, 2004)). Less than ten percent of the arable land is under cultivation. Id. Food security, shelter, water, sanitation, and healthcare remain practically non-existent. (DOS Recommendation (May 12, 2004)). Due to the damage to infrastructure caused by the civil war, certain nationals of Liberia cannot yet return home safely. There are 300,000 Liberian refugees in neighboring countries and 500,000 displaced within Liberia. (RIC Report (July 1, 2004)). However, the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) plans to begin to facilitate returns of Liberian refugees from surrounding countries in October, 2004. The current voluntary return of refugees from neighboring countries is already taxing the limited resources of the country. (DOS Recommendation (May 12, 2004)).

Based upon this review, the Secretary of DHS, after consultation with appropriate government agencies, finds that the conditions that prompted designation of Liberia for TPS are no longer met. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(A) and (B). The armed conflict has ceased. However, the Secretary of DHS also finds that the damage caused by the civil war has led to extraordinary and temporary conditions in Liberia that prevent the safe return of certain nationals of Liberia (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Liberia) who originally registered for TPS in 2002. The Secretary of DHS also finds that permitting nationals of Liberia who qualify for TPS to remain temporarily in the United States is not contrary to the national interest of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C). On the basis of these findings, the Secretary of DHS concludes that the TPS designation for Liberia based on an ongoing, armed conflict should be terminated and Liberia should be re-designated for TPS due to extraordinary and temporary conditions. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B) and 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C).

If I Currently Have TPS Through the Liberia TPS Designation, Do I Have To Register for the New TPS Designation?

Yes. If you already have received TPS benefits through the Liberia TPS designation, your benefits will expire on October 1, 2004. Accordingly, individual TPS beneficiaries must comply with the registration requirements described below in order to maintain their TPS benefits through October 1, 2005. TPS benefits include temporary protection against removal from the United States, as well as employment authorization, during the TPS designation period and any extension thereof. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(a)(1).

How Do I Register for TPS Benefits?

Applicants for TPS may register under the re-designation by filing (1) a Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, with the fifty dollar ($50) filing fee; (2) a Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization; (3) two identification photographs (1\1/2\ inches x 1\1/2\ inches); (4) supporting evidence as required to establish eligibility for TPS benefits as provided in 8 CFR 244.9); and (5) a biometrics fee of seventy dollars ($70) for each applicant over age 14. See the chart below to determine whether you must submit the one hundred and seventy five dollar ($175) filing fee with Form I-765.

An application submitted without the required fee and/or photos will be returned to the applicant. Submit the completed forms and applicable fee, if any, to the BCIS District Office having jurisdiction over your place of residence during the 180-day registration period that begins August 25, 2004, and ends February 21, 2005. An interim employment authorization document will not be issued to an applicant unless the Form I-765, as part of the TPS registration package, has been pending with BCIS more than 90 days after all requested initial evidence has been received, including collection of the applicant's fingerprints at an Application Support Center (ASC).

No Patience For H. B. Fahnbulleh’s Tired Writings: Debunking Sophism

No Patience For H. B. Fahnbulleh’s Tired Writings: Debunking Sophism

May 9, 2005
Author: Samuel D. Tweah, Jr.

The conclusion of H. B. Fahnbulleh's "Before the Time Comes" summons "deflated and demoralized" remnants of the "Progressive" movement to a national conference to "deal with the question of a national direction…” In “We Must Run While They Walk,” an apparent sequel, he asks “how have the politicians failed Liberia?” Playing part guru and part propagandist in his latest article, H. B. plunges into a highly self-contradictory argument, reversing all previous positions he once staked in the great debate on the march of modern Liberian history. In this piece, I trace the trajectory of H. B’s troubled intellectual inconsistency and diminish the weak arguments he presents on a number of critical questions. However, suffice it briefly to digress to deal with the “messenger” behind this recent “platitudinous effusion.”

Fahnbulleh is afflicted with Progressive nostalgia. He bemoans the passing of an era and the loss of an audience. He craves a gone Liberian age in which his hollow philosophical ranting will mobilize people to action. And he fantasizes about reconstructing Liberia’s social order from the debris of a failed Progressive movement. But more importantly, H. B. begrudges what he sees coming: the liberation of the masses from the distorted precepts of governance imposed upon them by a highly corrupt political class. This he fears the most, and for which he has now been recruited to celebrate the very same forces he once vilified.

Condemn an object in one breath , uphold it in another. Resign from the LPP yesterday, berating Togba Nah Tipoteh and feuding with Amos Sawyer, rejoin the LPP today to “gather the forces.” Lambaste Ellen Sirleaf yesterday as a lady who as finance minister under Tolbert “presided over the wastage of millions of dollars for the OAU jamboree at a time when the Liberian people were struggling for basic health care;” celebrate her today and say that “I would normally not come to her defense but since some want to condemn her as part of a collective, I will defend her.” Has H. B. now become the hired pen spin-doctoring the political missteps and failings of individuals he previously scolded? Does he defend Sirleaf out of conviction or only because others oppose her? Can this man maintain any consistent position long before his ink dries? What has he now become, an intellectual mercenary, cavorting from one cause or idea to the next? When did he convert to the idea that Progressives need to be united? Did not his over-inflated hatred of Charles Taylor provide a catalyst for bringing Progressive forces together in 1997? Or does Fahnbulleh now fear George Manneh Weah more than he once dreaded Charles Taylor?

These questions expose the chameleon character behind misguided commentaries penned in the guise of reason. Fahnbulleh’s vacillation destroys his authority to impart any understanding of Liberian history. Such inconsistency indicates confusion. One cannot provide knowledge or wisdom from the fountain of confusion. Over the years, we have all watched H. B. regaled the public mind with articles about the tragedy of Liberian democracy. We have seen him locked in interminable debates with different personages. Many of his thoughts have indeed been penetrating; reinforced by an ostensible show of rhetorical power. But recently as I have observed his political movements and utterances, especially as it concerns his unconscionable repositioning on important issues, I can only conclude that H. B. may now be affected by a form of diminishing intellectual returns. He seems to have reached the nadir of his intellectual utility. How can this man assume such crass arrogance that whatever falsehood he projects will stand on the merit of his intellectual personality, not on the force of his argument. H. B needs to be restored to intellectual sanity.

In “We Must Run While They walk,” he refutes claims that he has argued for the surrender of Liberian sovereignty; dreads the holding of elections in October 2005; defends the Progressive movement or Liberia’s traditional political class as not “erecting a culture of social disorganization,” because they have not governed; misstates the arguments about who has failed in Liberia by alluding to false claims that the “academically enlightened have failed the nation;” defends Ellen Sirleaf; attacks George Weah; and generally whines in a verbiage befitting a frustrated politician whose 25-year politicking in Liberia has come to naught.

Let’s now consider four issues he discusses in his piece: the question of the failure of Liberia’s political class; of violence concerning that class; the misstated claim that the “academically enlightened have failed,” and of course, his feeble attack against George Manneh Weah, that new generation hero presently catalyzing the forces of radical and progressive change in Liberia.

How Have the Politicians Failed Liberia?

He argues it is wrong to believe politicians have failed Liberia. He maintains that a whole political class cannot fail in that “the political class is not a single group with one direction.” Then he names the segment of Liberia’s political class that failed, writing “when we say the political class has failed, we are talking about that segment that that held power under the True Whig Party; that fooled around with the military from 1983 to 1990; with the NPFL from 1997 to 2003; and now, with the present arrangement.” Notice that he cuts off the years 1980 to 1983 from his delineation; because those were the years he served Samuel Doe as Minister of Education and Foreign Affairs. He also omits the years 1990-1995 when he served as roving envoy to Sawyer’s IGNU government, wasting scarce Liberian resources on meaningless trips. Yet this is a man who writes “an honest person will search for the truth no matter how it is hidden. A dishonest person will refuse to accept the truth no matter how obvious.” Is there a greater example of intellectual dishonesty? Certainly, we must crush falsehood and establish truth in this article.

Now that we have established that H. B. and some others are also part of the political class that failed, it spares us a little time and space to even belabor why they failed. He himself put it simply; they fooled around with the military regime from 1980 to 1990. Not only that, they failed massively in coercing political change in a society they least understood and at a time they were least prepared for it.

Progressives primarily failed in their inability to manage political opposition against Tolbert. They coerced change and fled its consequences. Those who take upon themselves the mantle to evolve change in any society are considered revolutionaries only when they anticipate and understand the forces of change they unleash on a people and are willing to abide the consequences. Progressives were schooled in the communist revolutionary cannon, but least understood its practical dimensions. Such description only befits revolutionaries like Fidel Castro of Cuba. Fidel’s instigation against the former Cuban leader Batista was not one of merely putting men in the streets to cause havoc, hoping to assume power out of the chaos. He understood the dynamic of Cuban society and conceived the basis of an institution that would deal with power after Batista’s dethronement. Fahbulleh and his Progressive band did quite the contrary. These men organized personality cults in the form of PAL, or MOJA with no institutional foundation and no understanding of how to manage power. Because they were the first generation of indigenous intellectuals which had returned from abroad with a modicum of learning at a time political change was demanded, the mantle fell naturally upon them. And their situation was even made easier. Tolbert was willing to institute drastic reforms. By the mid 70’s he and moderates within the TWP fully understood that Tubman’s Unification, Integration and Open Door policies had unleashed social, political and economic forces beyond the grasp of the party. Consciousness had spread through the population. Tolbert sensed this. His immediate response was to launch a massive reform effort. He ended the practice of public employees remitting a portion of their salary to the TWP; clamped down on corruption though it remained a fixture of the TWP oligarchy; encouraged women involvement in politics by appointing women to cabinet positions; launched a four year development plan in 1974; directed the lowering of the price of rice; abolished monopoly on importing rice; and liberalized the political climate by permitting more political organizing and the voicing of dissent. But what did the progressives make out of this? They saw it as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to cease power for which they had no plan. This greed for power led to intra-factional bickering among their rank and file.

As their cults of personality widened, the actions of different Progressive organizations became ascribed to their respective founders. The April 14, 1979 rice riot was patented by Bacchus Matthews. Tipoteh personalized MOJA’s modest successes. Theoreticians Sawyer and H. B. bided their opportunity to upstage both Matthews and Tipoteh. Disunity and suspicion became rife within the group. MOJA did not sanction PAL’s April 14 rice riot and its 1980 mid-night march against Tolbert, which Tipoteh characterized as “at best infantile and rather ridiculous.” Such wrangling led to the tragic failure to anticipate and develop a strategic framework for managing power in the context of the rapid political change the country was now going through.

All H. B. and his Progressive cabal cared about was to mobilize for mass action and foment tension, out of which anything could happen. Change in Liberia now depended on happenstance, on historical accidents. This was the Progressive prescription for producing change. They did not mobilize to build institutions able to survive trying political times. Regime change was their obsession. And when their numerous agitations did produce change, what did they do? They banded with Doe, encouraged the slaughtering of former TWP officials and jostled for influence and power, carefully watching one another’s advances. This is just an overview of Progressive failure of the 70’s going into early 80’s. The political class as H. B. has noted comprises more than just progressives. Let’s briefly examine its other components and do so via the lens of Fahnbulleh himself, maybe to point another instance of flip-flopping.

In “Liberia and Democracy” he writes:

“The charade has long since ended. What grumblings there remain are the reflexes of frustrated politicians who helped orchestrate the farce, but were themselves duped in the end by more unscrupulous political tricksters. The tragedy of this whole affair is that the people, in their determination to oust the racketeers who now rule their country, are willing and ready to sacrifice their lives in defense of the domestic opposition, without realizing that those who now lead this opposition are the very people who through cunning and stealth imposed Sergeant Samuel Doe and his band of thieves on them in the first place.”

Yes! This is vintage Fahnbulleh in his brutal candor, capturing the emergent decay of a political culture that would prove problematic for the country over the next two decades. One can only wish he would maintain that position. Unfortunately, two decades later, he doesn’t. Yesterday, he considers the political class a colossal failure, today he touts it as not “erecting a culture of social disorganization.” Which position are we to accept? I prefer the earlier version because it bears the hallmark of H. B. in the heyday of his fearless honesty. Numerous events may have now compromised that prior substance. Anyway, let’s deal with the man in his current metamorphosed personality. He writes “one cannot accuse a people or a political class of ‘erecting a culture of social disorganization’ when the decay brought about has to do with the repression, brutality and irresponsibility of those who hold power.” Ohm, quite a stretch! Is H. B arguing that this decay was caused by Doe’s brutality? He continues, “If this class has not held power for twenty-five years, how is it possible for it to have erected “a culture of social disorganization?” Yes. That is highly possible and this is what happened in Liberia. The answer lies right there, in H. B’s own prose as quoted earlier. Opposition political elements, in wheeling and dealing with sitting governments or leaders, affect both the style and substance of governance. Because members of Liberia’s political class are predominantly in politics for selfish reasons, they have usually acted in ways that send mixed messages to leaders. Take Samuel Doe and some of his cabinet for example; H. B. Fahnbulleh as Education minister, Togba Nah Tipoteh from Planning and Economic Affairs and Bacchus Matthews at Foreign. There three Progressives sitting at the high table. What went wrong? Different theories and speculation abound. Is it that pre-1980 bickering among progressives carried over into the new regime? Or were progressives in government countered by other forces (Fahnbulleh’s version) that feared Progressive influence and power? Affirmative answers to any of these questions only indicates that the “decay” H. B. mentions as having “to do with the repression, brutality and irresponsibility of those who hold power,” actually originates elsewhere. This is only logical. A “culture of social disorganization” is just what it is: a culture. Cultures evolve, comprising the habits, precepts, mores and values of a people from one era to the next. How can H. B. argue Liberia’s social disorganization originated with Samuel Doe? Did not Progressive opposition in the 70’s indicate a smoldering of this decay, which only festered in the 80’s and beyond? Could it be that the prolonged deprivation of Liberia’s indigenous mass created a culture in which formerly deprived indigenous leaders decided to maximize the gains for themselves once they gain power or access to it, just as True Whig Party leaders had done? These are theoretical considerations that render weak the claim that a “political class has to be in power before it can affect a culture of social disorganization.” Fahnbulleh would never have made this argument in 1983 after he had abandoned Samuel Doe.

The Political Class Did Not Introduce Violence in Liberia

Lets now deal with the question of violence and examine closely H. B.’s statement that the “political class did not introduce violence in Liberia.” He writes, “as a matter of fact this class has always indulged in what some commentators refer to as ‘jaw-jaw instead of war-war.’ This is the nature of intellectuals and other educated people. They analyze, speculate and diagnose instead of resorting to arms as the first recourse for settling disputes. However, there is a rare breed of such people who would readily resort to violence. In this category are those who combine their political ideas with radical action to change a situation. But even here, this form of action/protest is resorted to after thorough deliberation and consideration.” H. B. continues, “in Liberia, from the death of Tubman to 1980, various segments of the political class argued, analyzed, debated, and speculated, but did not once resort to violence to take power.” This is plain baloney and intellectual confusion. Here he attempts to distinguish mob action such as April 14 rice riot against Tolbert, which was indeed violent, from Doe’s overthrow or Taylor’s rebel insurgency. Does he understand the role of the violence in the overthrow of Tolbert; the April 14 1979 rice riot and the arrests of Matthews and others for charges of planning violence? Is he now flipping back to a position of detesting violence after celebrating it for so many years? The confusion is profound. In one section of the article, he extols the role of violence in producing change, arguing “It was only in the context of violent repression by a regime which had no legitimacy that some patriots decided to act. This is the only way patriots throughout history have acted. In the face of brutal and savage repression by tyrants, heroic patriots have risen to their responsibility to redeem their nation and people.” He asks further “Are patriots to refrain from decisive action against injustice because people will die in the process? History does not move in this way. In our case, after 1985, there was nothing to show that the regime would not go on killing, terrorizing and brutalizing the people as was done between 1980-84.” Writing all this, yet maintaining that “the political class did not introduce violence in Liberia.” Where are we headed? Can this man take one position and maintain it throughout a discourse?

The ‘Academically Enlightened have failed Liberia’

It is sad that H. B. stoops to lending credence to false claims that the “academically enlightened have failed Liberia.” He belabors the claim, going so far as to state the obvious. That “there are many educated people who have contributed positively to our development but have not been in the political class. There are farmers, midwives, medical doctors, bankers, engineers, teachers, scientists, agronomists, etc. without whose contribution we would not have our people surviving today.” This needs no arguing. The argument is not that the academically enlightened have failed, but that academically enlightened political actors of the brand of Fahnbulleh and his progressive cabal, coupled with other political degenerates, have used the political process in Liberia as a platform to self-enrichment and power aggrandizement. This is the argument. The masses have seen that those who advocate for change in Liberia mask their real intentions which become exposed when they assume power or enjoy access to it. And they have held power in one form or another, in the early 1980’s, and during the IGNU regime, though H. B. would disagree. Where is the evidence that Progressives and other political leaders have championed the interest of the masses when they were able to pull the levels of power? During the regime of IGNU, Fahnbulleh roved the planet as Special Envoy, achieving nothing, but wasting scare Liberian resources in the process. While he did that, his younger IGNU Progressive cadres were drinking beer and wasting public money on flashy girls in Monrovia. The nation’s currency was changed during this era and we all know the story of how IGNU officials reaped a fortune out of the process. These are the enlightened ones who are considered failures by the masses and not all educated people as H. B. would have us believe. But H. B introduces the misstated claim as a means to begin an attack on an unassailable character, a man who now holds the greatest promise of delivering the aspiration of our people: GMW.

On The Issue of George Weah

H. B. waffles in a pool of trivial arguments which I will not deal with because they have been considerably dealt with elsewhere. We cannot rehash failed arguments about Weah’s education, leadership ability or experience. However, he asks three questions he believes are critical for electing Weah to the Liberian presidency: 1) “How many kids has [Weah] assisted in school or college?” 2) “Has he built a soccer school for poor kids to attend like Patrick Viera and others have done in Senegal?” And 3) “Has Weah ever been a part of any social or political struggles for the promotion and defense of justice, liberty and equality?” Now, going by H. B.’s logic if Weah has done any one of these, then he deserves to be president. Let’s follow that line of reasoning and respond to each question. 1) Yes, Weah has assisted countless number of high school and college students. In the late 90’s Weah provided money to Abraham Massaley’s ULSU leadership which defrayed scholarship costs for downtrodden students at the UL. 2) No. Weah has not built a school for soccer kids. 3) Yes. Weah has contributed to the struggle to rid Liberia of tyranny. In 1996 his home was looted and burnt, relatives raped when Weah progressively suggested the UN intervened in Liberia to save the country from continued tyranny. So according to his own logic, H. B. agrees that Weah can be president because the man has achieved two of out three of his concerns.

But at a more advanced level H. B’s questions betrays the Progressive spirit, if there is one. How can this highly reputed Progressive elevate the influence of money, possibly bad money, in Liberian politics? The notion that to be president an individual will have to personally finance projects, while commendable, is dangerous. Such a prescription encourages crooks with vast financial means to seek the presidency. The massive trust Weah now enjoys is not in the concretion of what he did—monies he spent, scholarships he gave—but rather in the sheer patriotic symbolism of his giving, especially at a time when corruption defined the country. The masses believe that were Weah to guard the national treasury and administer the distribution of resources, their interests would be served far more than if a selfish and greedy Progressive leader were to assume power.

Weakening his case further, H. B. writes, “Weah is not the only great footballer in Africa, but in other countries, the people know how and where a man’s talent can best be used. In Guinea, we find Petit Sorie, Titi Kamara and others. These men are great footballers. Have we heard them talking about ruling Guinea? In Cameroon, there are Roger Miller, Rigobert Song, Samuel Eto'o, Patrick Mboma, Geremi Fotso Njitap and many others.” Are we now seeing the “maggots or the carcass” of H. B’s intellectual remains? What childish logic is this? Below is his syllogism:

Roger Miller is rich.George Weah is rich. Roger Miller is a former football player.George Weah is a former football player.Miller does not want the presidency of Cameroun. Therefore: Weah should not seek the presidency of Liberia. Where do they teach this kind of reasoning? What if I were to counter with the equally false syllogism:

Arnold Schwarzenegger is a celebrity.Jesse Ventura is a celebrity.Arnold and Jesse both sought the governorship of their respective states in the US.

George Weah is a celebrity in Liberia.Therefore: G. W. too should seek the Liberian presidency. This is where H. B. wants to take us. We cannot oblige.

Importantly, to whom is he addressing his question, “what has George Weah done for Liberia…?” Is he making a case to the masses? Does he regard the masses as the ultimate determinant of any criteria for candidates who desire their votes? The masses have long since concluded that they will do no political business with rabble rousers like Fahnbulleh who theorize one thing and practice another. They have borne numerous insults from the likes of Fahnbulleh who writes, “poverty-stricken masses care less for human rights than for the satisfaction of their basic needs.” He further degrades the masses in “Democracy and Liberia” when he writes that “the new military leaders were from the downtrodden of society--that humiliated and degraded mass for whom money means everything.” Yet, this is the man who is confused about why the masses crave George Weah.

The Liberian masses have endured many a tragedy. They have borne two dictatorships imposed upon them by misguided elements who risked a country’s future by tinkering with change when they were least prepared for it. They rejected the political class and voted Taylor in 1997 because it was the very political class who empowered him to pillage and terrorize the country. How could they reject Taylor and endure his post-election defeatist violence while those who armed and supported him sheltered in the comfort of America? Our people are not stupid. The political class deceived them by imposing a tyrant upon them. They could only reward that deceit by legitimizing the tyrant. Deceit for deceit. It is sad that the masses took a hit in electing Taylor as president, but they live on to fight another day. That day has now dawned in the populist emergence of the patriot George Manneh Weah.

So H. B. and others who believe that the populist groundswell bringing Weah to power is a “mobocracy” and are vowing to resist it can brace themselves for a tough battle. Anyways, what are threats from men like H. B. who flirt with danger and flee when tension heightens? Can he explain the Pandema Road Prison Situation in Sierra Leone in which he led several young militants in an attack against Samuel Doe but cowardly escaped, leaving several to be butchered in cold blood. Where is the proof of vaunted militant bravado? Vacuous utterances, bereft of any practical effect. He could not achieve politically. Neither could he militarily. Yet this is the man who vows to resist a people’s genuine struggle, summoning battered Progressives to a lost cause, and quoting the Mwalimu in the process.

When Mwalimu taught that “we must run while they walk” he was addressing that core of true African visionaries and revolutionaries; men and women who “knit rather than unravel nations” as Robert Rotberg from Harvard puts it. H. B. Fahnbulleh cannot quote this great old man with any authority because H. B. too has betrayed the teachings of the Mwalimu. George Weah and the new breed of revolutionaries will pick up after the Mwalimu. This is the mantra of the new generation!!!

About the Author:

Samuel D. Tweah, Jr. currently resides in Minnesota, USA and can be reached at dtweah@yahoo.com

UN urged to put Taylor on trial

UN urged to put Taylor on trial

Charles Taylor was a flamboyant and controversial figureThe new chief prosecutor of Sierra Leone's war crimes tribunal says he hopes Liberia's exiled former leader Charles Taylor will soon face trial.

Desmond de Silva said if a UN Security Council resolution was passed this month, Nigeria might be persuaded to hand him over to the UN-backed court.

Mr Taylor was offered asylum in Nigeria in return for giving up power in 2003.

Meanwhile, Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo has discussed the issue with US leader George W Bush.

Mounting pressure

Mr Obasanjo said the terms of Mr Taylor's exile had to be borne in mind but said he would work with the US to address its desire that Mr Taylor face justice.

This week the US House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for Nigeria to turn him over to the court.

I will do everything in my power to bring that monster of evil Charles Taylor to answer his indictment by the special court

Desmond de SilvaChief prosecutor, Sierra Leone Special CourtNigeria agreed to give him asylum under a deal to end Liberia's civil war and has said it will not hand him over to the tribunal, which has indicted him on 17 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his alleged role in Sierra Leone's conflict.

"Charles Taylor is our highest potential defendant... having been responsible in large parts for the savagery of the civil war that took place in Sierra Leone," Mr de Silva told the BBC's Network Africa programme.

"I sincerely hope... this month the Security Council will pass the resolution ... and with the Security Council on board I think that Nigeria might be persuaded."

'Network of warlords'

Mr de Silva, 65, a British lawyer who has been deputy to David Crane, will step up in July.
"I pledge to you Sierra Leoneans and the world that I will do everything in my power to bring that monster of evil Charles Taylor to answer his indictment by the special court," he said following his appointment.

The incoming chief prosecutor of the Sierra Leone Special Court said the mounting international pressure on Nigeria to hand over the former Liberian president was a good sign that Mr Taylor would face justice soon.

Earlier this week, Mr Crane said that Mr Taylor was behind an attempt to assassinate Guinea's President Lansana Conte in January, in revenge for Mr Conte's backing of Liberian rebels.
"From exile, Charles Taylor remains in contact with his political network in Liberia on a day-to-day basis. He has also mobilised his network of warlords and cronies to keep West Africa in turmoil," Mr Crane said.

Mr Taylor has not commented on these latest charges.

MEDIA CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE MANDINGOES

A WEB OF GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE MANDINGOES

May 9, 2005
Author: A B Dolley (LIMINY)

Despite allegations of discriminatory practices in the registration process for the coming elections in October against Mandingoes by election registrars, the Liberian Government and the National Election Commission are yet to come out with any tangible explanation as to why the registrars are disqualifying people because of ethnicity. Sources close to NEC headquarter disclosed that senior officials at the National Election Commission have instructed the registrars to disqualify as many Mandingoes as possible to reduce any chance of Mandingoes’ influence in the new government.

The method, according to the source, is to set criteria that many Mandingoes are likely to fall prey to. “First they ask them for their name and if for example they say Mamadee, they are automatically disqualified from the process.” The source said further that the registrars are giving false registration certification receipts to Mandingoes, some of who cannot read or write. Varlee Kieta of the Red Light Market, acknowledged going through similar ordeal. “They asked me for my name, when I told them my name is Varlee, they told me that I was not a Liberian because I can’t speak English.”

Many observers believe the credibility of the election results will be questionable if the increasing reports of discriminatory practices by the registrars are not investigated and addressed. “It has reached to a point where if the government does not intervene it will drag us back to war,” said Karmoh Sheriff of Vai Town.

Though officials at the National Election Commission have denied any discrimination against Liberian Mandingoes, information gathered indicates that the registration process is fraudulent and discriminatory especially against Mandingoes. Sources closed to various registration polls in and around Monrovia say that discrimination is actually taking place at all polling stations. “As soon as they know that you are Mandingo, they refuse you,” one Gardnersville resident who prefers anonymity said.

In Monrovia, there have been reports of irregularities and discriminatory practices on the part of registrars toward Mandingoes. On Jamaica Road for example, Mamadee Fofana was denied the right to register simply because of his name.

Others think the registrars have not been trained to identify who is a Liberian; as a result they just used stereotypical judgment to determine eligibility. “We just came from a war in which Mandingoes were active participants and some of these registrars were either fighters or sympathizers to some of the warring faction. It is possible that the war sentiments are driving their decisions,” said James Jallah of Monrovia.

Also in the Gardnerville areas, several people from the Mandingo ethnic group were refused simply because of their name, or because they could not speak English. James Youboty, a Liberian writer living in Philadelphia said that religion is a factor. “I think it is wrong to single people out because of their ethnicity. I also think it has something to do with religion too. There are some people who believe that Liberia was founded on Christian Principles and they do not like Mandingoes largely because of their religion.”

Media Biases

The media, they say, is supposed to serve as a watchdog and is supposed to give positive direction to the populace in time of crisis. But the Liberian media has shown that it suffers from the same virus that has affected the rest of the country, tribalism. For example, when the news came out about the discrimination against Mandingoes, BBC Johnathan Palaylaye wrote that Mandingoes were flooding from Guinean into Liberia to register for the elections. Mr. Palaylaye, staying true to his journalistic style, gave the impression that all of the Mandingoes he wrote about were Guineans.

Jomah Kolleh, in a telephone interview from Voinjama, said “This is pure nonsense and ignorant. How can people believe that all the Mandingoes in Guinea will just leave their homes and come to Liberia to register for the election? These people are not ready for peace."

Abu Massalay of Sinkor thinks that only Mandingoes are being singled out as foreigners. “If a Gio, Mano, Kpelleh, Kissi or a Khran man comes from Guinea or the Ivory Coast, the next day that man is a citizen. Only Mandingoes are foreigners in Liberia all the time.”

A news story on the Analyst website also shows some of the media biases against Liberian Mandingoes. In the news story the Analyst repeats the same nonsensical belief that the late President Doe granted Mandingoes their Liberian citizenship. “Most Liberians think the government needs to take a firm stance on the question of Mandingoes whose Liberian nationality was duly recognized by slain President Samuel Kanyon Doe. Liberia’s history book mentioned the Mandingo tribe as one of the 16 tribes of Liberia but there have been questions as to why the tribe does not have a particular settlement in the country. It is also undisputedly argued that not all Mandingoes in Liberia are Liberians,” the Analyst wrote.

Also in its April 27, edition, the Analyst website alleged that Mandingoes have no settlement in Liberia. “What about the Quadou Gboni Mandingo Chiefdom in the Viojama District, Lofa County, and the thousands of Mandingoes that have settled in Nimba County and Bopolu before even Liberia was founded as a Nation? These people are not real journalists,” Garmadee sheriff pointed out.

Many Liberians believe the media have to redefine its role in post warLiberia. “The systematic hate messages in the media against Mandingoes if not curtailed will lead to big trouble. These kinds of irresponsible writing does not only undermine the peace process, but they perpetuate the falsehood we have been fed for a century. Moreover, it exposes the hatred some of those people who profess to be journalists have for other Liberians because of their ethnicity,” a Liberian, who prefers anonymity, said.

“It is reflected every day in their publication. For example, recently, a land dispute between two neighbors turned into a Christian-Muslim War. When all hell broke lose with both sides causing mayhem on each other, an ELBC broadcaster was airing hate messages against Mandingoes people. I do not know under what circumstances such misinformation and inflammatory pieces would be cleared for publication on the Analyst Website,” John Weedor, a journalism student at Temple University observed.

“It is very gross for some of us living in the United States to have any interest in investing our future in Liberia if we continue to read stories like the one Paylalaye wrote on the BBC website and the two recent news stories on the Analyst website, all in reference to Mandingoes. Some of us have just lived in the United States for only five or six years and we are not only permanent residents but also citizens eligible to vote in the world most developed country. While in Liberia, West Africa, where all black people including Mandingoes come from, stories about tribal difference and derogatory references to people because of their ethnicity surface in the media all the time, written by people who are supposedly journalists responsible to the people.” Soko Kanneh, a Liberian Youth Living in Philadelphia observed.

“It is hard to say, but could it be enviousness or something. It is a fear factor for some Liberians because they think the Mandingoes are forceful enough to win the election. As a result they are afraid to create a plain field, so they have to bring about some kind of obstacles to fairness,” Randolph Jabateh of New York said.

Another interesting twist to this voter registration process is that while some media commentaries have expressed disappointment about the lack of enthusiasm and low turnout among Liberians, they have ignored the fact that some Mandingoes who have exercised their constitutional rights have been denied. Media conspiracy? Government conspiracy? From all indications, it fair to say both.